Securing the Electorate: A Cryptographic Vote

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Introduction

- Using Adi Shamir's cryptographic scheme based off of polynomial interpolation in a finite field as a base, we sought to create a voting system.
- Our application allows for being set up for any organizational structure. e.g.
  - A small group of top executives having complete power
  - Every single member having equal say
  - A hybrid of these two structures
- Voting organizations created via the application have the functionality to vote on and sign documents.
  - The signing of documents is done via DSA following the guidelines from FIPS 186-4.
- Organizations can be made via a interactive designer based in terminal or by a config file.

Polynomial Interpolation

$$Given\ points: (x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), ..., (x_k, y_k).$$

$$P(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k} y_j l_j(x),$$

$$where\ l_j(x) = \prod_{\substack{0 \le i < k \\ i=j}} \frac{x - x_i}{x_j - x_i}.$$

Illustration of Polynomial Interpolation



Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (S4)

Encryption (Key-Generation)



Decryption



Attacker



Asynchronous Neville's Method

$$\begin{array}{llllll}
x_0 & y_0 = P_0 & & & & \\
\hline
x_0 & y_0 = P_0 & & & & \\
x_1 & y_1 = P_1 & P_{0,1} & & & \\
\hline
x_0 & y_0 = P_0 & & & & \\
x_1 & y_1 = P_1 & P_{0,1} & & & \\
x_2 & y_2 = P_2 & P_{1,2} & P_{0,1,2} & & \\
\hline
x_0 & y_0 = P_0 & & & & \\
x_1 & y_1 = P_1 & P_{0,1} & & & \\
x_2 & y_2 = P_2 & P_{1,2} & P_{0,1,2} & & \\
\vdots & & & & & \\
x_k & y_k = P_k & P_{k-1,k} & \ldots & P_{0,\ldots,k} = D &
\end{array}$$

Sample Run

- Voting Application
  - Allows for interactive building of a voting organization or to use a predefined configuration
  - A Terminal application
  - Voting process which results in documents being signed if a vote passes





These images are sample runs of the voting system without the gui. Left: A sample of the interactive designing of a voting organization. Right: A sample of a voting session, where one document is signed and another vote is initiated.

Level of Security

- S4 is both Information-Theoretic Secure and Perfectly Secure.
- Information-Theoretic Secure
  - Even with infinite computing power S4 could not be broken.
  - However, since we use the secret data as a private key for DSA signatures, our system loses this quality, but it is still as secure as DSA which is secure.
- Perfectly Secure
  - If there is ciphertext produced that uses it, no information about the plaintext is provided without knowledge of the key.

Structure of Voting System

Shamir's Scheme can be extended into a hierarchical structure.
We can simply compute
$f(x, y) = D_i \pmod p$,
which translates a key-pair into an integer, to use as the secret data for the lower tier of the hierarchy.

Then, when voting, to recover the data a reverse function is used,
$g(D_i) = (x, y)$.

The digital signing for the documents sets is done with DSA as described by DSS.



Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

- Given primes p,q; generator g; and private-public key pair (x,y).
- Select a hashing function H. (We chose SHA-2)
- Signing a message m:
  - Randomly generate a value k where $1<k<q$.
  - Calculate $r = (g^k \pmod p) \pmod q$. (Ensure $r \neq 0$)
  - Calculate $s = k^{-1}(H(m) + xr) \pmod q$. (Ensure $s \neq 0$)
  - Return the signature: (r, s).
- Verifying the signature for the message m:
  - Calculate:
    - $w = s^{-1} \pmod q$.
    - $u_1 = H(m) \times w \pmod q$.
    - $u_2 = r \times w \pmod q$.
    - $v = (g^{u1} \times y^{u2} \pmod p) \pmod q$.
  - If $v = r$, verified; else, not verified.



Attack Vectors and Implications

- False keys
  - Duplicate Keys: Solved
  - Invalid Keys: Could be solved by assigning public-key pairs
- Theoretical 100% voter turnout
  - Since a vote passes only with enough votes, abstention is equivalent to voting no
  - This makes it difficult for an active minority to pass laws taking advantage of low voter turnout
- Any single voter located higher in the voting structure has more power than any single voter located lower in the structure.
  - Simply make all individual voters exist on the same level

Future Work

- Move from simulations on a single machine to simulations using networking
- Further analysis of how secure the cryptography is?
- Convert into a Web App?
- Have each level inherit the documents from above, and able to make additions that lower levels will inherit, like federal/state laws

Literature Cited

- Shamir, Adi, "How to Share a Secret." Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, Jan. 1979, pp. 612–613., doi:10.1145/359168.359176.
- Blakley, G.R. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Proc. AFIPS 1979 NCC, Vol. 48, Arlington, Va., June 1979, pp. 313-317.
- Burden, Richard L., et al. Numerical Analysis. 10th ed., Cengage Learning, 2016.
- FIPS 186-4

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