Cybersecurity Research & Education at CI

October 29, 2019 Michael Soltys

bit.ly/CyberAtCI2019

California State University at Channel Islands: Department of Computer Science











Cybersecurity

- GCTF: 40K unfilled jobs in California, 300K+ nation wide (https://www.cyberseek.org/heatmap.html)
- IP stolen: F-35 now the J-31
- Ransomware damages in 2018 to exceed \$8B
- Baltimore City hit, \$18M loss, crippled for a month

(https://www.comparitech.com/antivirus/ransomware-statistics/)



We all have a role in keeping America's vital information systems & our nation safe. That's why we've partnered with @WHNSC @NSF to honor educators who are preparing the next generation of cybersecurity professionals! blog.ed.gov/2019/10/nomina...

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- We want to serve our region:
 - As a hub of expertise
 - Create a workforce
 - Offering training
 - Educating the public
 - Research & Development

"Security is the process of maintaining an acceptable level of perceived risk for a specified event"

- Richard Bejtlich

Our Philosophy "Theory in practice"

- Strong theoretical foundations:
 - Mathematics
 - Algorithms and Protocols
 - Programming ——— Software Engineering
- Practical applications:
 - Hands on examples
 - R&D on real world problems
 - Partnerships with the industry

Why all these attacks?

- Large attack surface
- Complexity
- Attribution
- Skill vs Ability

- Small gains
- Skills gap
- Public education

What are the challenges?

(Challenges are opportunities!)

- Scientific foundations
- Software Engineering
- Business, IT & Academia

- Education:
 - Public
 - Workforce
- Compliance: standards, policies and regulations



October 11, 2019

8:00AM - 4:00PM

California State University Channel Islands Petit Salon



Sponsored By Haas Automation Inc. CSU Channel Islands



Open to all businesses or individuals in Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties with interest in cybersecurity and keeping business secure.

Snacks and lunch will be provided.


Please RSVP via the link below or email by Oxtober 4th:

https://bit.ly/2ZnytPH cybersecurity-conference@haascnc.com

If you have questions please email: cybersecurity-conference@haascnc.com

<u>Schedule</u>

Arrival/Registration: 8:00AM - 9:00AM Welcome: 9:00AM - 9:30AM Keynote: 9:30AM - 10:30AM Presentation: 11:00AM - 12:00PM 12:00PM - 1:00PM Lunch: Presentation 1: 1:00PM - 1:30PM Presentation 2: 1:30PM - 2:00PM Presentation 3: 2:30PM - 3:00PM Presentation 4: 3:00PM - 3:30PM Closing: 3:30PM - 4:00PM



The NETSEC

The NETSEC club is a cyber security focused student organization.

What we do:

Talks from professionals in industry
Particpate in online CTFs (Capture the Flag)
Tutorials/demos of pen testing tools









Our CTF team, 0x325, participates in online CTF competitions during the semester.

Collaboration with SoCal HTTF


SEAKER



Password Beast



Voyager



Virus Total

VirusTotal



Courses

COMP 424/524

3 Klein's attack on RC4

Suppose w key streams were generated by RC4 using packet keys with a fixed root key and different initialization vectors. Denote by $\mathsf{K}_u = (\mathsf{K}_u[0], \ldots, \mathsf{K}_u[m]) = (\mathsf{IV}_u || \mathsf{Rk})$ the uth packet key and by $\mathsf{X}_u = (\mathsf{X}_u[0], \ldots, \mathsf{X}_u[m-1])$ the first m bytes of the uth key stream, where $1 \leq u \leq w$. Assume that an attacker knows the pairs $(\mathsf{IV}_u, \mathsf{X}_u)$ – we shall refer to them as samples – and tries to find Rk.

In [5], Klein showed that there is a map \mathcal{F}_i : $(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^i \to \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ with $1 \leq i \leq m$ such that

$$\mathcal{F}_i(K[0], \dots, \mathsf{K}[i-1], \mathsf{X}[i-1]) = \begin{cases} \mathsf{K}[i], & \text{with Prob} \approx \frac{1.36}{n} \\ a \neq \mathsf{K}[i], & \text{with Prob} < \frac{1}{n} \text{ for all } a \end{cases}$$

If the first i bytes of a packet key are known, then the internal permutation S_{i-1} and the index j at the (i-1)th step of the RC4 key setup algorithm can be found. We have

$$\mathcal{F}_i(\mathsf{K}[0],\ldots,\mathsf{K}[i-1],\mathsf{X}[i-1]) = \mathsf{S}_{i-1}^{-1}[i-\mathsf{X}[i-1]] - (j_{i-1} + \mathsf{S}_{i-1}[i]) \bmod n$$

The attack is based on the following properties of permutations.

Theorem 1 For a random permutation P, and random number $j \in \{0, ..., n-1\}$, we have

$$\operatorname{Prob}(\mathsf{P}[j] + \mathsf{P}[\mathsf{P}[i] + \mathsf{P}[j] \bmod n] = i \bmod n) = \frac{2}{n}$$
$$\operatorname{Prob}(\mathsf{P}[j] + \mathsf{P}[\mathsf{P}[i] + \mathsf{P}[j] \bmod n] = c \bmod n) = \frac{n-2}{n(n-1)}$$

where $i, c \in \{0, ..., n-1\}$ are fixed, and $c \neq i$.




AWUS 036 ACH

Cryptoanalysis How to break a code Encoding vs Encryption

Base 64 Encrypted String:


oZ04bYkMsJoFV3csbYwcmXEcjnHzj3EUlHndV4kMsJoFbYkMsJ oFeVU1wqcBtpM6bZcFtpw7wVDzV34Bbak7s1U5uKc4vKkGbZQ5 bak7slUBtpw7wW/zV4w7rqjztpIAuKcHrpDztZYBsVUCv1U4xp n/bT8WuKo/sVU5v5YAslUHta3zs5o0v5sIuVUGxpIAsqkFxmPz Vz8cu1UKtZYHbZk8vKk0u6jzsZo4vafzuKbzvJA8sqfBbT8Vwq cBwVUHtZnzs54FsluCs1UHtZ4Bslu4xpoGiFTdmJLzwJ00wVUK tpM6vFU3rqc4bZ04bZYGvZ4FsmPzV4w7rqjzwZ04bZ00u5j/bZ k0v5nzvJo8x5nzwZ04bZs8v5nSbT7djpM3baw7rqjzvJ0CwpE3 sqb/bVrzwJ00wVU0v6j/bT8WuKo/sVUHwJ4GwVUHtZnzvJ4Bsq wGbZQ5bak7x1U7spYFwWPzV3YBsVUKtZoBbak7x1U7spYFwVU1 spw0u1UHuFU1spYHeVTdoJ00wVU3v5o0sVU7rpM3iFT5baw7rq jzsac4rpjzs5o4wWPzVz8qtZYHbak7slU7rpIAsqbSbaw7rqjz wZ04bZq7rp4BeVTdlpLzwJ00wVU5wqcBrpq4baw0vFUHta3zr6 c0tpLSbT8qtZYHbak7s1U0u6s8uWPzwJ00wVU3v5o0sVU6v5YG vVDzV3k0v5nztqkGbZk4rpk/xlUHsqcFuKcGbZq/rqqDblTdV4 w7spLzwZ04bagHrqcGbak7v5oKbZkCwJLzwZ04tqbzvKU4rqcG bT8Uu5jzwJYHsqb6sVU7spYJspLzwJ4HtVUHtZo8v1UHspYFvG 7zV3k8sVU7slUGup4/slU7tqfzwJQFtFUHuFUGspnSbT8Xtpjz tZnzwJ0CbZI0sZnzwZ04bXE0upbzupY+slUHtZo4iFTdV4kMsJ oFbYkMsJoFbZcIv5M8u5vzr6c8sJ0HeVTdlpLzwZ04bZsCv5oG wafzuJrzwZ04bZM8sJ0Hh1TdoJ00wVU8upICv6k0uVU7rpM3bZ OFbZoMslDzV3k0v5nzs6c0upnzwZ0MbZs4rqc5wpDzvK4AupoH v63SVz ==

Theory in Practice



Needham-Schroeder Protocol

Theory in Practice




Needham-Schroeder Protocol



Kerberos: 3 headed hound of Hades


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


AWS Cognito: Identity Federation


Penetration Testing



Kali Linux




Wireshark



Palo Alto Firewall

Future: Security in the Cloud

Shared Responsibility Model





Design Principles


- Strong identity foundation
- Traceability
- Security at all layers
- Automate

- Protect data in transit and at rest
- Principle of least privilege
- Prepare for security events









michael.soltys@csuci.edu

@MichaelMSoltys

http://prof.msoltys.com

